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1 Introduction
Consider the following problem. A buyer, B, can trade with either of two
possible sellers, S and E. These sellers may have di¤erent production costs,
so that the gains from each possible, alternative trade are respectively 1 and
;  2 [0; 1]. How would economic theorists model such a problem? How can
we predict its outcome? There may be di¤erent answers to these questions,
in particular with respect to the protocol used in negotiations or even with
respect to the need of specifying one. However, it seems quite safe to say
that most would predict trade between B and S if  < 1 (e¢ ciency) and
also that E, the non-participating player, will appropriate zero surplus.
The example above describes what in essence is a problem of two in-
terrelated, simultaneous, two-party negotiations. It also describes one of
the simplest three-person (B;S; and E) cooperative games. We do not
have a general model for the former, but we do have one for the latter.
If we let v denote the characteristic function of the game, we could set
v (fB;S;Eg) = v (fB;Sg) = 1, and v (fB;Eg) = , where v (Z) represents
the value of coalition Z, and for all other coalitions (including one-player
coalitions) v(Z) = 0. Thus, we may argue that instead of proposing ad hoc,
non cooperative protocols to complete the description of the problem, or
combining cooperative and non-cooperative elements to that e¤ect, it would
be more appropriate to use a solution concept from cooperative game theory.
The most prominent candidate would probably be the Shapley value.
Unfortunately, the Shapley value predicts that E obtains a payo¤ equal
to 6 (positive!).
1 Why is this counterintuitive outcome predicted? There are
several ways to dene (or characterize) the Shapley value, but perhaps the
most popular is the "random order of arrival" story. Here, players arrive
in a (uniformly distributed) random order. As players arrive, they form
1Generically, probabilistic values (see Weber 1988) would predict positive payo¤s for
E.
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coalitions with the players already present after securing a payo¤ equal to
the marginal contribution to that coalition. Then the Shapley value is equal
to the expected vector of payo¤s. In our example, there are six possible
orders, and in one of them player E arrives second only to B. The marginal
contribution of E to the coalition fB;Eg equals , and that explains Es
positive payo¤. The Shapley value implicitly presumes that players B and E
can credibly threat player S with trading among themselves leaving him out
of the deal. Moreover, it also presumes that in that event E would be able
to capture a positive share of . Of course, these can be thought of as only
threats that determine Es relative bargaining position, since eventually the
e¢ cient trade is predicted to take place. In other words, Es positive payo¤
may be thought of as a sort of bribe that allows B and S to implement the
e¢ cient trade without any interference from E.
In the problem we are considering, however, as well as in many other
economic examples, we have no reason to assume that two-player coalitions
are formed (and solidied) in any order, random or not, before the nal
trade is agreed upon. We would argue that it seems more natural to describe
the problem for B, S, and E as one of simultaneous negotiations between
B and S, on the one hand, and B and E, on the other. Even then, the
negotiation between B and S might be a¤ected by the alternative potential
trade between B and E, and vice versa. However, both negotiations end
only when one of the pairs reach an agreement and thus determine the
nal outcome. In this case, under what circumstances trade between B and
E represents a meaningful alternative to the trade between B and S, and
then can inuence the terms of the latter? Also, if it does, under what
circumstances E might be able to get a positive share of their surplus, ?
Consider the extreme case of  = 0: This is equivalent to erase E out
of the picture. Thus, we may feel comfortable using the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) applied to the negotiations between B and S and predicting
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(unless we have reasons to believe that players are heterogenous in their
bargaining skills) that B and S will split the surplus equally. Consider now
the case  2  0; 12. We still argue that the potential trade between B and
E is not relevant. Indeed, suppose that B claims a payo¤ higher than 12 in
her negotiations with S since her fall-back option, a fraction of , is higher
than Ss fall-back option, which is 0. In this case S can rightfully consider
that such di¤erences are not relevant since trade between B and E will not
be reasonable to materialize. Indeed, in such trade B could at most obtain
a payo¤ of  < 12 . Thus, there is no reason to expect that B will ever refuse
a payo¤ of 12 due to a more attractive deal with E. In other words, if  <
1
2 ,
we should predict that the e¢ cient trade will take place and that players B,
S and E will get 12 ;
1
2 and 0; respectively.
Suppose now that  2 12 ; 1. In this case the situation is quite di¤erent.
An agreement of B and S to split the surplus equally will leave B with
feasible, alternative trades at mutual advantage with E. Thus, potential
deals between B and E are now relevant even if they do not actually occur
(with positive probability). So, even if it is only reasonable to predict that
the e¢ cient trade must take place, how will B and S split the surplus?
Could we predict that B gets a payo¤ strictly higher than ? If so, we
would be back in a position analogous to the split 50   50 when  < 12 .
Indeed, if this is the predicted deal, then any mutually advantageous deal
between B and E would leave B worse o¤ than the predicted outcome in
the negotiations between B and S, and therefore negotiations between B
and E would again be irrelevant. But if this is the case, then there is no
reason for B to expect more than 50% of the surplus. Thus, predicting
any split where B appropriates more than  will not be consistent. On the
other hand, suppose that we predict that player B gets a payo¤ strictly
lower than  in her negotiations with S: If that was so case, there would
be mutually advantageous negotiations between her and E, and we should
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then instead predict that some of these deals will be stricken instead, a
deal that again could be improved upon by B and S, etc. Thus, the only
reasonable prediction is that the e¢ cient trade takes place and players B,
S and E obtain ; 1   ; and 0; respectively. Thus, when  2 12 ; 1 the
alternative trade between B and E is relevant to determine the outcome
of the negotiations, and nevertheless player E does not obtain any share of
the surplus. Or, put in other words, the non-participating player obtains
nothing and the participating, non indispensable player obtains a payo¤
equivalent to his competitive advantage, 1  : In the limit as  approaches
one (the gloves game), and both non indispensable players become perfect
substitutes then the indispensable player is able to appropriate the entire
surplus (in analogy with Bertrand competition).
In this paper we develop a solution concept, the R solution, for three-
player cooperative games that in particular is consistent with these predic-
tions for simultaneous, alternative two-player negotiations. The concept is
in the spirit of the NBS and treats the two possible trades symmetrically.
From this point of view, the R solution sets "disagreement points" in the
two-player negotiations endogenously. Moreover, unlike the Shapley value,
it has the property that ex-post, that is, after the deal is stricken, there are
no deviations by two of the parties that are protable for the deviating par-
ties without the concourse of the other player. In this sense, the solution we
have outlined above does not need to preclude any coalition from exploring
opportunities before a nal deal is stricken. In other words, when parties
divide the surplus they need not envision any coalition to form and stick
together before this deal is reached. This seems an appropriate property of
a solution when negotiations between all three parties are simultaneous and
only one trade is feasible.
Although the motivation for our concept comes from alternative trades
between one buyer and two sellers (or two buyers and one seller), many eco-
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nomic issues and models that share its key elements (see Section 4) require
that we go beyond this simple problem and dene a full edged solution
concept for general, three-player games. In order to do so, we will need
generalizing the problem in two ways. First, we should allow the coalition
of players S and E to generate positive surplus, v (B;E) > 0: player B is
not indispensable anymore, but her contribution is necessary to achieve the
e¢ cient outcome. In fact, once we do that we remove the asymmetry in the
roles of our buyer and sellers. Second, we should allow the grand coalition
to generate net positive value: v (B;S;E) > v(B;S).
Thus, let us assume that v (fB;S;Eg) = v (fB;Sg) = 1, v (fB;Eg) = ,
and v (B;E) =  (and still assume that the value of each individual player
is 0). Without loss of generality assume that 1      0. First, note
that the discussion before for the case  < 12 still indicates that if ( )
 < 12 then alternative trades for both sides, B and S, are irrelevant and
we should still predict that B and S will trade and split the surplus equally.
Second, if   12 and  < 1    then again the outcome will be the one
obtained for  = 0: the alternative trade for B now matters but not the
alternative trade for S.
The situation changes when  +   1. In this case, all three bilateral
negotiations are relevant, and all three trades could conceivably take place.
There is no deal between two-parties that is such that none of them can
explore more attractive, mutually advantageous deals with the party left
out. Thus, all three trades may be expected with positive probability. But
for that to be a consistent prediction, it must be the case that no party
prefers one of her possible trades to the other. Indeed, consider any trade
in particular. This trade necessarily leaves one party outside, and therefore
eager to see either of the alternative trades materialize. Thus, if one of the
parties to the trade considered does prefer dealing with the excluded party
to taking part in the trade then we should never expect the trade to take
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place. Therefore, if we denote by ui player is predicted payo¤, i = B;S;E;
if an agreement is reached with either of is potential partners, then it must
be the case that:
uB + uS = 1
uB + uE = 
uS + uE = 
This system of equations determines all payo¤s in "bilateral trade". As
we have mentioned, all these trades are conceivable now. We need to specify
the probability that each of them would materialize. It tuns out that, for
each vector of parameter values (; ), there is a unique probability dis-
tribution such that (ui; uj) is in fact the NBS in the bilateral negotiation
between i and j; assuming that their disagreement points are the expected
(according to that distribution) payo¤ in their respective alternative trades.
That is, there is only one probability distribution compatible with Nash
behavior and consistent with playersindi¤erence between their alternative
trade opportunities.
For the rst time, it is now important to consider what the coalition of
three players can achieve. Indeed, when  +   1 there is room to form a
genuine grand coalition. Since, as we have mentioned, all three trades can
conceivably materialize if parties insist on decentralized negotiations, two-
party negotiations by themselves do not guarantee that the outcome will be
e¢ cient, in the sense that the payo¤ of the grand coalition, 1, is achieved.
Thus, since there are gains from conducting three-party negotiations, we
should expect these to take place. Moreover, having analyzed the two-party
negotiations and then possessing a probabilistic assessment of which one of
them would materialize if the three-party negotiation were to fail, we can
easily compute the "disagreement point" for such negotiation. Thus, once
again in the spirit of the NBS, we presume that an agreement between the
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three players will eventually take place, it will include the e¢ cient trade,
and will dictate a division an equal, three-way split of the surplus net of
the disagreement payo¤s computed as the expected payo¤s in two-party
negotiations.
As mentioned above, a standard interpretation of the Shapley value jus-
ties the positive payo¤ of the non-participating player, E, on the basis of
his contribution to facilitate the e¢ cient trade. We consider this a very
useful insight. In this respect, our contribution is to clarify the set of cir-
cumstances under which the non-participating player does play an e¤ective
role, and therefore needs to be taken on board to facilitate the e¢ cient trade.
Finally, when v (B;S;E) > v(B;S) forming the grand coalition adds ad-
ditional surplus v (B;S;E) v(B;S). Our solution concept extends without
new complications to that situation by predicting that this additional sur-
plus is equally split like the surplus of the three-party negotiation that we
have just commented.
Summarizing, in the next section we will propose a new solution concept
for three-player games in which the payo¤s are the NBS of the three-player
negotiation with disagreement points equal to the expected utility of the
outcome of the simultaneous two-player negotiations; which, in turn, con-
sists of a vector of predicted payo¤s for each negotiation plus a probability
distribution over these alternative trades. In each two-player negotiation the
payo¤s are the NBS with disagreement points equal to the expected payo¤
that each player obtains in their alternative trade.
2 The R solution of a three-person game
Let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of players, and let 2N represent the set of subsets
of N . An element Z 2 2N represents a coalition. A game in characteristic
form is the pair (N; v), where v : 2N ! R satises v(?) = 0. We assume v
to be monotone.
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Assumption 1 (monotonicity): If Z  Z 0, then v(Z)  v(Z 0).
To save some space, we will use an abbreviated notation for the v func-
tion. Thus, we will let vij = v(fi; jg), vi = v(fig) and V = v(f1; 2; 3g). Also,
without loss of generality, we will assume that v12   v1   v2  vij   vi   vj
for all j 6= i. That is, the coalition f1; 2g is the (weakly) most "e¢ cient"
among the two-player coalitions. Likewise, we will assume that v13 v1 v3 
v23 v2 v3. Thus, the coalition f1; 3g is the second most "e¢ cient" coalition.
Also, without loss of generality we will normalize vi = 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3.
Thus, all that we will obtain below relative to payo¤s should be interpreted
as payo¤s in excess of these one-player coalitionspayo¤s. Apart from this
caveat, the normalization is without loss of generality. Also, every time we
write "for all i; j" or "for all i; j; k" we mean for all i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j,
and for all i; j; k = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k; i 6= k, respectively. That is, di¤erent
sub/superindeces in the same expression will always denote di¤erent players.
The heart of our solution concept is a prediction of the outcomes of
the three possible bilateral negotiations, including which of these negoti-
ations would succeed (with what probability), should three-player negoti-
ations failed. As we discussed in the previous section, in many economic
applications this is in fact all that will be needed to predict the outcome of
the game. Thus, we begin by formally propose a solution concept for these
simultaneous, two-party negotiations.
A solution for bilateral negotiations includes the fall-back option and
the predicted payo¤ for each player i in each bilateral negotiation ij, which
are denote by tiji and u
ij
i respectively; and a probability distribution over
these three negotiations, with pij denoting the probability that players i
and j strike a deal. Given these fall-back options, tiji , and in the spirit of
the NBS, players i and j share any surplus equally, provided this surplus
is positive (vij  tiji + tijj ). That is, uiji = 12

vij + t
ij
i   tijj

. However, if
their fall-back options sum up to an amount in excess of the value of the
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coalition, vij < t
ij
i +t
ij
j , then players will not be willing to strike any deal (at
least one of them prefers to have the chance to reach an agreement with its
alternative partner). Therefore, the payo¤s from this negotiation are zero
(i.e., their individual payo¤s).
In turn, the fall-back options are computed according to the payo¤s
predicted in, and the probability distribution over, alternative two-party
negotiations. In particular, if the negotiation between i and j ounders,
and players contemplate their options in the large picture of all two-player
negotiations, and therefore what they expect to get as a default for this
negotiation, tiji , they can see that, (i) with probability pij what they face is
precisely this default, tiji , (ii) with probability pik coalition (i; k) will strike
a deal, and player is payo¤ is uiji , and (iii) with probability pjk it will be
coalition (j; k) who will strike a deal, and hence is payo¤ is zero. Thus,
tiji = pijt
ij
i + piku
ik
i . If pij < 1 we can rewrite this expression as follows:
tiji =
pik
1  pij u
ik
i
Thus, player i0s fall-back option in its negotiation with j is the expected
payo¤ in its alternative negotiation, where this payo¤ is weighted by the
"conditional" probability of being able to reach an agreement with player k,
given that its negotiation with j has come to a halt.
So far, we have described how payo¤s are determined for a given proba-
bility distribution. The description of our solution concept is completed by
imposing one condition on how payo¤s a¤ect probabilities. In particular, we
require that if pij > 0 then u
ij
i  uiki and uijj  ujkj . That is, an agreement
between players i and j is reached with positive probability only if both
players weakly prefer such agreement over their alternatives.
Thus, the outcome of simultaneous, bilateral negotiations builds on the
NBS for each negotiation with endogenous fall-back options. The solution
sketched above would not be well (uniquely) dened if probability distrib-
utions were degenerate (in the above expression, if pij = 1). In order to
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overcome this di¢ culty and the multiplicity this would allow, we will dene
our solution concept as the limit of a sequence of some "restricted" outcomes.
More specically, we begin by dening a restricted solution concept.
Denition 1 For  > 0, an  R solution to simultaneous, bilateral nego-
tiations,    R SSBN for short, for the three-player game (N; v) is a triplen
uiji () ; t
ij
i () ; pij ()
o
i;j=1;2;3
that satises:
1)
uiji () =
(
1
2

vij + t
ij
i ()  tijj ()

if vij  tiji () + tijj ()
0 otherwise;
2) tiji () = pij () t
ij
i () + pik ()u
ik
i (), for all i; j; k;
Denition 2 3) p12 () + p13 () + p23 () = 1 ; pij ()  1    for all i; j;
and for all i; j; k, pij () >  only if u
ij
i ()  uiki () and uijj ()  ujkj ().
We now study the existence and limiting properties of this  R solution
concept for simultaneous, bilateral negotiations.
Proposition 1 For  small, an -R SSBN,
n
uiji (); t
ij
i (); pij()
o
, exists for
the game (N; v). Moreover, lim!0
n
uiji (); t
ij
i (); pij()
o
exists (and then is
unique). Also,
1) if v12  v13 + v23 and v13  12v12, then lim!0 p12() = 1, and
lim!0 u121 () = lim!0 u122 () =
1
2v12;
2) if v12  v13 + v23 and v13  12v12, then lim!0 u121 () = v13 whereas
lim!0 u122 () = v12   v13, and if v13 < v12 then lim!0 p12() = 1; and
3) if v12  v13+v23 then lim!0 uiji () = lim!0 uiki ()  ui = vij+vik vjk2 ,
for all i; j; k, and lim!0 pij()  pij = uiuju1u2+u1u3+u2u3 :
Proof. See Appendix.
We now have the instrument needed to predict the outcome of two-
player, simultaneous negotiations, and therefore the fall-back options in the
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three-player negotiation. Thus, we are ready to dene our solution concept
for the game (N; v), the R solution.
Denition 3 An R solution for the three-player game in characteristic
form (N; v) is a triple (U1; U2; U3) that satises:
a) Ui = 13(V + 2Ti   Tj   Tk) for all i; j; k, where
b) Ti = piju
ij
i + piku
ik
i , and
c) pij = lim!0 pij (), and u
ij
i = lim!0 u
ij
i (), where for each , the
triple
n
uiji () ; t
ij
i () ; pij ()
o
i;j=1;2;3
is a  R SSBN for the game (N; v).
The grand coalition shares the surplus V  T1 T2 T3 according to the
NBS. Player i0s fall-back option, Ti, is her expected payo¤ in the simulta-
neous, bilateral negotiations. More specically, Ti = piju
ij
i + piku
ik
i , where
both probabilities and payo¤s in each bilateral negotiation are the limit of
the -R solution, as  goes to 0.
Characterizing this solution, in particular its existence and uniqueness,
requires characterizing lim!0
n
uiji (); t
ij
i (); pij()
o
i;j=1;2;3
. This is done in
Proposition 1. Other than that, the R solution is a three-player NBS.
Since Ti, i = 1; 2; 3 exists and is unique, the proof of the following theorem
is straightforward.
Theorem 1 The R solution exists and is unique.
The computation of the R solution is in fact extremely simple. What we
o¤er below can be considered a user manual, and to that e¤ect we take into
account the value of one-player coalitions that so far we have normalized to
0. It is convenient to split the parameter space in three di¤erent regions (See
Figure 1). Let ij be the net surplus that can be created by coalition (i; j),
i. e. ij = vij   vi  vj : In the previous section, we set these surpluses to 1,
 and , for ij = 12, 13, and 23 respectively. Recall that we are assuming,
without loss of generality, that 12  13  23  0. Dene Region 1 as
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the area satisfying 13  1212, Region 2 as the area satisfying 13  1212
and 23  12  13, and Region 3 as the area satisfying 13  1212 and
23  12   13. The following Table 1 contains the expression for the
R solution in each of these regions.
Table 1: The R solution
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
U1
2V+v12+3v1 3v2 2v3
6 v13   4v33 + V v123 V+v12+v13 2v233
U2
2V+v12 3v1+3v2 2v3
6
2(v12 v13)
3 +
2
3v3 +
V v13
3
V+v12+v23 2v13
3
U3 v3 +
V v12 v3
3
2
3v3 +
V v12
3
V+v13+v23 2v12
3
Computing these values for the rst two regions is straightforward. Re-
gion 3 is a little more involved, since the expressions for Ti are also more
involved. However, there is an interesting property that R solution satises
that will simplify these computations: for each game (N; v) there exists a
number 	 such that
pij (uk   vk) = 	 for all i; j; k: (1)
The surplus that player k obtains if one of the coalitions in which he par-
ticipates is called to reach an agreement is uk vk: Also, pij is the probability
that player k does not get uk   vk. Therefore, condition (1) indicates that
the "loss" experienced by player i with respect to the benchmark where he
is able to secure ui with probability one, is the same for all i = 1; 2; 3: This
property will drastically simplify the computation of nal payo¤s. More
specically, player i0s expected payo¤ in the solution of the bilateral nego-
tiations is:
Ti = (pij + pik)ui + (1  pij + pik) vi = vi + (pij + pik) (ui   vi) :
We can further rewrite this expression using condition (1):
Ti = vi + (ui   vi) 	 = ui  	:
As a result the R solution for player i is given by:
Ui =
1
3
(V + 2Ti   Tj   Tk) = 1
3
(V + 2ui   uj   uk) ;
13
and making further use of Proposition 1 we obtain the nal expression:
Ui =
1
3
(V + vij + vik   2vjk)
3 Discussion
In this section we discuss the properties of the R solution and how it com-
pares to other solution concepts like the Shapley value and the Core.
3.1 Payo¤ di¤erentials between the Shapley value and the
R solution
The R solution only coincides with the Shapley value at two points of the
parameter space: v13 = v23 = 0 and v13 = v23 = v12.2 We rst investi-
gate how the R solution treat di¤erent players with respect to the Shapley
value. This comparison is straightforward and is summarized in the follow-
ing proposition (See Figure 2).
Proposition 2 With respect to the Shapley value, according to the R solution:
(i) Player 3s payo¤ is lower for all parameter values
(ii) Player 2s payo¤ is lower if and only if v13  34v12   14v23 in Region
2, and v13  12 (v12 + v23) in Region 3.
(iii) Player 1s payo¤ is lower if and only if v13  2v23 in Region 1, and
v13  35v12   25v23 in Region 2.
The intuition is somewhat transparent along the vertical axis (v23 = 0) :
Suppose v13 is relatively low. Then, according to the R solution the alter-
native trade between players 1 and 3 is irrelevant and, unlike the Shapley
value, any increase in v13 is not reected in higher payo¤s for players 1 and
3 and a lower payo¤ for player 2. As a result player 2 is better o¤ and
players 1 and 3 worse o¤. Suppose now that v13 is relatively high. Player
2 In the rst point (v13 = v23 = 0) the R solution coincides with the NBS of the game
for players 1 and 2. In this sense, both the Shapley value and the R solution are gener-
alizations of the NBS to the case of three players.
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3 is a close, although inferior, substitute of player 2. This does not allow
player 3 to secure a positive payo¤, but the competition e¤ect of its presence
drastically erodes player 2s payo¤. Since the Shapley value treats players
in a more "egalitarian" manner, in this region of the parameter space play-
ers 2 and 3 are worse o¤. Finally, for intermediate values of v13, coalition
(1; 3) becomes relevant, which benets player 1; but player 2 still maintains
a signicant competitive advantage. As a result only player 3 is worse o¤.
If v23 > 0 then the balance between di¤erent e¤ects is more complex.
Even in Region 3, where the R solution grants Player 3 a positive payo¤,
this is smaller than the one granted by the Shapley value. If v13 is su¢ ciently
high player 2 is worse o¤ unless v23 is su¢ ciently close to v13. That is,
whenever players 2 and 3 are close substitutes from the point of view of
player 1; this tends to hurt player 2 unless their joint value, v23, is su¢ ciently
strong.
3.2 Which Shapley axiom is violated by the R solution?
As is well known (see for instance Winter, 2002), the Shapley value is the
only value that satises the axioms of e¢ ciency, symmetry, dummy player,
and additivity. That means that the R solution should violate at least
one of these axioms. The R solution satises e¢ ciency, that is, for any
game U1 + U2 + U3 = V . It also satises symmetry. That is, if U is the
R solution of (N; v) and U 0 is theR solution of (N; v0) where v0(Z) = v(Z 0)
and Z 0 = fi 2 N j(i) 2 Z g, for some bijection  : N ! N then Ui = U 0(i)
for all i 2 N . In other words, the name of the player has no e¤ect on its
value. Also, the R solution satises the dummy axiom. In other words, if
v(S[i) v(S) = 0 for every S  N , then Ui = 0. Thus, the R solution must
violate the additivity axiom. That is, if (N; v) and (N; v0) are two games
with solutions U and U 0 respectively, and we consider the game (N; v00)
where v00(Z) = v(Z) + v0(Z) for all Z  N , it may be that its R solution
15
U
00
does not satisfy U
00
i = Ui + U
0
i .
We will argue that for the class of problems that we are envisioning this
is a strength of the concept rather that a weakness. Consider once again
our initial example with one buyer, B, and two potential sellers, S and E.
Suppose that there are two goods and the buyer demands one unit of each. In
the production of the rst, S has a cost advantage, so that v(B;S) = 1 and
v(B;E) =  2  12 ; 1, whereas in the production of the second it is E who
has the cost advantage, so that v0(B;E) = 1 and v0(B;S) = . According
to the R-solution, E obtains 0 in the rst game and 1   , in the second.
The game v00 = v + v0 then satises that v00(B;E) = v00(B;S) = 1 + , and
v(B;S;E) = 2. Imposing additiviy means that player E, for instance, should
still fetch 1    in game v00. In fact, in v00 the R solution grants him one
third of that amount. That is, additivity implies that the negotiations over
the two goods are conducted independently, while the R solution implicitly
presumes that both negotiations are tied, which is very reasonable in this
abstract setting. In particular, the fact that S may also supply the good
for which he has a competitive disadvantage is a handicap. One may argue
that this makes no sense, since E can always "destroy" his ability to supply
that good. But consider such possibility, that is the game ev = v00 except
that ev(B;S) = 1. This is a game in our Region 2, with E as player 3. If
three-party negotiations fail, as we argued in the introduction, there seems
to be no reason to expect that player 3 gets any payo¤ in this region. Thus,
the most he can expect is in fact a third of V   ev(B;E), that is, a third of
1  . This is in fact what he gets in the R solution.
3.3 The Core and the R solution
It is well known that the Shapley value is not necessarily in the Core
even when the Core is not empty. This is another di¤erence between the
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R solution and the Shapley value or any probabilistic value.3
Proposition 3 If the Core of the game (N; v) is not empty, then the R solution
U is in the Core.
Proof. Since the R solution is e¢ cient, all we have to show is that either
Ui + Uj  vij for all i; j or the Core is empty. When v12  v13 + v23 this
is satised trivially. Indeed, in that case U3 = 0, Ui  vi3, for i = 1; 2, and
U1+U2  v12. When v12 < v13+v23 the Core may be empty. Indeed, this is
the case if, for instance, V = v12. We rst derive the condition for the Core
not to be empty in this case. An element of the Core is a positive vector
(x1; x2; x3) such that: (i) x1 + x2 + x3 = V and (ii) xi + xj  vij for all i; j.
Adding up these last three conditions, we obtain x1+x2+x3  v12+v13+v232 ,
which combined with condition (i) gives:
V  v12 + v13 + v23
2
: (2)
Thus, assume that condition (2) is satised and also that v12 < v13 + v23.
Then, it is immediate to check that Ui + Uj  vij for all i; j:
4 Applications
In this section we illustrate the use of our solution concept by discussing
three important examples in the literature where ex-post bargaining among
three agents play a central role. We will discuss how modelling the outcome
of these negotiations as the R  solution of the game that agents play a¤ect
the conlusions of those papers. We will do that by introducing a common
framework as follows. There are three goods, one consumption good and
two inputs, and three players, B, S, and E. Thus, we recover the names of
3As shown by Weber (1988), a probabilistic value is e¢ cient only if it is a random-
order value, and in our superadditive setting e¢ ciency is a condition for an allocation to
be in the Core. The set of all random-order values contains the Core, but no single one is
"always" contained in the Core even if we restrict attention to three player games.
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players used in Section 1, but keep the notation introduced in Section 2 with
only substituting B, S, and E for 1, 2, and 3. Player B is a consumer who is
able to obtain a potential utility w from one unit of the consumption good:
Player S can produce one unit of an input at a cost cs: He also makes an in-
vestment decision, x 2 [0; 1] ; that costs 	(x), which is a twice di¤erentiable
function with 	(0) = 	0 (0) = 0; 	0 (x) > 0;	00 (x) > 0; limx!1	(x) =1:
Higher investment may either enhance player Bs utility, w, or may reduce
his own production costs, cs. Player E can also produce one unit of the
second input at cost ce. Player E does not make any explicit investment
decision but he is associated with a random variable y 2 [0; 1], which is
distributed according to the cumulative function H (y). The transformation
of inputs into the consumption good may require the use of an asset.
There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2: In period 0 agents sign contracts
that in particular may assign property rights over the asset. In period 1
player S chooses x and simultaneously the realization of y becomes known.
Hence, player S is uncertain about y when he chooses x. Both x and y
are observable but not veriable. Actual trade takes place in period 2;
after investment has been chosen and uncertainty resolved. In most cases,
there is room to (re)negotiate production decisions and how the gains from
trade are shared. The common theme in the papers discussed below is
how (incomplete) contracts signed in period 0 a¤ect investment decisions in
period 1, given that agents anticipate renegotiation in period 2. Thus, in
each case we will be interested in analyzing the payo¤s of S as a function of
his investment x under di¤erent contracts, and compare his best decision to
the e¢ cient one. Each contract (or the lack of it) plus the realization of the
uncertain y and the decision x determine a three-player cooperative game
(negotiation) in period 2.
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4.1 Allocation of property rights (Hart and Moore, 1990)
Hart and Moore (1990), HM, study how the allocation of property rights
over assets a¤ect the ex-post relative bargaining position of di¤erent play-
ers, which in turn determine ex-ante incentives to make asset-specic invest-
ments. In their introductory example, players S, E and B are called the
chef, the skipper and the tycoon, respectively, and the asset is a yacht. If
we let w be given by:
w (x; y) = x+ y;
and cs (x) = ce (y) = 0, we have a version of their example4. In other
words, the chef and the skipper provide their services on the yacht, which
are enjoyed by the tycoon. The rst best level of e¤ort, x, is implicitly
given by:
	0 (x) = 1:
Contracts in period 0 are incomplete, and in fact the only aspect that can
be contracted is the right to use (or exclude from the use of) the asset.
One of the insights of this paper is that, even though player B does not
take any e¢ ciency-related decision, it may be optimal to allocate all residual
rights to this player. The reason is that player B is indispensable to the asset
(without her participation the yacht is useless). The authors arrive to this
conclusion assuming that payo¤s in period 2 are determined according to
the Shapley value. Each potential assignment of property rights originates
a di¤erent game in period 2. In all of them, the grand coalition has a value
V = x+ y: (3)
Also, in all of them any coalition that does not include B has a value of 0.
(B is indispensable.)
4Hart and Moore assume that the investment x can take only two values, 0 or 100.
Dealing with continuous variables is more illustrative but basically equivalent.
19
(i) Suppose, rst, that player S (the chef) owns the yacht. This means
that no coalition that excludes S generate any value. Thus,
vSB = x; (4)
and appart from the grand coalition, all other coalitions have value 0:
(ii) Suppose now that player E (the skipper) owns the asset. In this case
the only coalition with a positive value other than the grand coalition is
vEB = y: (5)
(iii) Finally, suppose that player B (the tycoon) owns the asset. Now,
there are two two-player coalitions with a positive value, which are given by
equations (4) and (5)
In case (i), Ss marginal contribution to the grand coalition (with weight
1
3) is x+ y; and his contribution to the coalition with player B (with weight
1
6) is x. Thus, his Shapley value is
Us =
x
2
+
y
3
:
Therefore, in period 1 player S chooses a level of e¤ort x, which is given by:
	0 (x) =
1
2
:
Clearly, there is underinvestment, since x < x.T here is an ex-post
holdup problem, which is typical in this incomplete contract settings. Once
investment is sunk, the player that paid for the investment is forced to share
its returns with other players.
In case (iii), player S contributes x to the grand coalition, and also (with
weight 16) x to the coalition with player B. Thus,
Us =
x
2
:
Therefore, player S is worse o¤ than in the case he owns the asset, but
investment incentives are identical in both cases. In particular, if player B
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owns the asset, player S chooses in period 1 a level of investment equal to
x.
Finally, in case (ii), player Ss contribution to the grand coalition (with
weight 13) is x, and thin his Shapley value is:
Us =
x
3
:
As a result, the underinvestment problem is exacerbated, since in period 1
player S chooses x< x; which is given by 	0 (x) = 13 . From an e¢ ciency
point of view, in this example either player S or B should own the asset,
but not player E: The asset should be in the hands of either the agent that
exerts an e¤ort or the agent which is indispensable for the asset.
Conclusion 1 Under the Shapley value it is optimal that player B (the
indispensable player) owns the asset.
This celebrated result, however, is sensitive to the solution concept of
the bargaining game. Indeed, let us analyze the same problem under the
R solution.
In case (i), in the bilateral negotiations players S and B equally split the
value they can guarantee for themselves, x. Hence Ss disagreement point
in the trilateral negotiation is TS = x2 . Since the value added by the grand
coalition is y then player Ss payo¤ is given by
Us =
x
2
+
y
3
:
Therefore, in this case player S chooses x: Since there is only one two-player
coalition with a strictly positive value, player Ss payo¤ is identical to the
one obtained under the Shapley value.
In case (ii), player S has nothing to bargain about exclusively with player
E (since player B is indispensable) or with player B (since player E owns
the asset). Therefore, his disagreement point in the trilateral negotiation is
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Ts = 0. Since the value added by the grand coalition is x player Ss payo¤
is
Us =
x
3
:
Therefore, in this case player S chooses x. Once again, player Ss payo¤ is
identical to the one obtained under the Shapley value.
Finally, in case (iii) there are two two-player coalitions, (B;S) and
(B;E), and then with a strictly positive value the outcome of simultaneous,
bilateral negotiations depend on the di¤erence between x and y:
If x2 > y, player S is able to capture one half of his contribution to his
coalition with B. Thus, in this region TS = x2 : Since the grand coalition
adds a surplus of y, his nal payo¤ is Us = x2 +
y
3 , which is identical to the
Shapley value.
If x > y  x2 ;in the bilateral negotiations player S can guarantee to
himself his entire "competitive advantage" with respect to player E vis-a-
vis player B: That is, his disagreement point in the trilateral negotiation is
TS = x  y. Hence, his payo¤ is Us = x  2y3 :
If x  y, player S is in an extremely weak position in the bilateral negoti-
ations, so that he cannot guarantee anything positive for himself. Thus, the
disagreement point in the trilateral negotiation is TS = 0: Since the value
added by the grand coalition is x, then Us = x3 :
Therefore, player S0s ex-ante expected utility is given by
EUs = H
x
2
 x
2
+
h
H (x) H
x
2
i
x+ [1 H (x)] x
3
+
1
3
Z x
0
ydH (y) 
Z x
x
2
ydH (y) ;
and then his choice of investment, bx, satises
	0 (bx) = 1 + 2H(bx)
3
  1
2
H(
bx
2
):
This may be higher or lower than the level predicted under the Shapley
value, x. If investment costs are su¢ ciently low so that H(bx) approaches
22
1, then the incentives to invest are enhanced if the tycoon owns the yacht.
However, if costs are su¢ ciently high, then H(bx) will be closer to 0 and
investment is discouraged if the tycoon owns the yacht. In other words,
under the R solution the model will not unambiguously predict which is the
most e¢ cient ownership structure unless we have more information about
the relative competitive position of S and E:
Conclusion 2 Under the R solution it may not be optimal that player B
(the indispensable player) owns the asset.
4.2 Exclusive contracts (Segal and Whinston, 2000)
Segal and Whinston (2000), SeW, study the role of exclusive contracts in
the protection of relation-specic investments. Their main insight is that,
under complete information, exclusive contracts are irrelevant in protecting
the incumbent sellers relation-specic investment, unless such investment
has an externality on the entrant. In fact, this is a somewhat counterintuive
result that contradicts the received wisdom (for instance, Klein 1988, Marvel
1982, or Masten and Sneyder 1993).
In this subsection we examine the robustness of this result presented
in their Section 2. Let player B (buyer) derive a potential utility w = 1
(independent of x and y) from one unit of the consumption good taht can
be provided by both, S and E at a cost that for simplicity we assume
cs (x) = 1 x and ce (y) = 1 y respectively. No particular asset is necessary
to produce the good or, equivalently, both S and E have access to the
necessary asset. In period 0 players S and B may or may not sign an
exclusivity contract. If they do, then in period 2 player B cannot purchase
from E without Ss permission.
The rst-best level of investment, x, is the solution to the problem of
choosing x in order to minimize total costs:Z x
0
(1  x) dH (y) +
Z 1
x
(1  y) dH (y) + 	 (x) :
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Thus,
H (x) = 	0 (x) :
As a solution concept for the renegotiation at period 2, SeW consider
the case where in period 2 the entrant is willing to supply the good at a
price pe = 1 y. That is, the entrant has no bargaining power, perhaps as a
consequence of there being many identical entrants with the same (uncertain
at time 1) cost. Players B and S split equally any surplus from renegotiation
over the disagreement point, which depends on whether or not they had
previously signed an exclusive contract.
In the absence of any contract, if x < y; B always prefers to purchase
from E, and player S makes zero prots: Us = 0: If x  y then it is e¢ cient
that B purchases from S. However, when they bargain over the price, player
S has no outside option, tS = 0, but player B can threaten to switch and
purchase from E at a price equal to 1   y and make prots tB = y: Since
they split the surplus over the disagreement point, x   y, then Us = x y2 :
Thus, under non-exclusivity, in period 1 player Ss expected payo¤ (gross of
investment cost) is
EUnes =
1
2

H (x)x 
Z x
0
ydH (y)

:
Since player S chooses x in order to maximize EUnes   	(x), then the
solution, x, is given by the rst order condition:
1
2
H (x) = 	0 (x) :
In this case, as expected, there is underinvestment: x < x: The entrant
obtains no surplus but whenever player S is the most e¢ cient supplier he
shares equally the returns from his investment with player B.
Under an exclusive contract, the relative bargaining position of players
B and S in period 2 change dramatically. If x  y then it is e¢ cient that B
purchases from S: They split the surplus equally but now the disagreement
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points are also 0 for both players: B can no longer threaten with purchasing
from E without B0s permission. Hence, Us = x2 : If x < y the e¢ cient trade
(B purchases from E at a price 1 y) requires an agreement between B and
S: They split a surplus of y and the disagreement points are once again 0 for
both players. Hence, Us =
y
2 . Thus, under exclusivity, player Ss expected
utility in period 1 (gross of investment cost) is:
EU es =
1
2

H (x)x+
Z 1
x
ydH (y)

:
Therefore, under exclusivity player S chooses the same investment level, x;
that under non-exclusivity. Indeed, note that
EU es   EUnes =
1
2
Z 1
0
ydH (y) :
That is, an exclusivity contract is an e¤ective instrument to capture addi-
tional surplus (at the expense of E), but this additional surplus does not
depend on the investment x, and then it does not help protecting relation-
specic investments.
Conclusion 3 Under a competitive entrant and Nash bargaining between
the buyer and the incumbent seller, an exclusivity contract is irrelevant from
an e¢ ciency point of view. With or without exclusivity the level of invest-
ment is ine¢ ciently low.
In their general model, SeW assume a more general bargaining model
in period 2, with the only restriction that payo¤s are linear to marginal
contribution of players. That is, a generalization of the Shapley value. The
main result holds. Let us see that this is indeed the case. In the case of
nonexclusivity, we have:
V = max fx; yg ; (6)
vSB = x; (7)
vBE = y: (8)
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The rest of coalitions have a value of 0. Under the exclusivity contract,
equation (8) is replaced by
vBE = 0: (9)
Now consider the incentives to invest assuming Shapley value payo¤s
with no exclusivity. Ss payo¤ equals Unes =
1
3 max fx  y; 0g+ x6 . Thus, Ss
expected utility in period 1 is
EUnes = H (x)
x
2
+ [1 H (x)] x
6
  1
3
Z x
0
ydH (y) :
Therefore, the rst order condition for the maximization of EUnes  	(x) is
1
6
(2H (x) + 1) 	0 (x) = 0: (10)
Note that in this case, player Ss optimal value of x may be higher or lower
than x. Indeed, evaluated at x, the left hand side above equals 16  23H (x).
Therefore, if investment is very costly for S, so that H (x) is small, then
there is overinvestment, and otherwise there will be underinvestment again.
On the other hand, under exclusivity, player Ss payo¤ is equal to U es =
1
3 max fx; yg+ x6 . Thus, Ss expected utility in period 1 is
EU es = H (x)
x
2
+ [1 H (x)] x
6
+
1
3
Z 1
x
ydH (y) :
Once again, note that the di¤erence EU es   EUnes is constant in x:
EU es   EUnes =
1
3
Z 1
0
ydH (y) :
Conclusion 4 Under the Shapley value, an exclusivity contract is irrelevant
from an e¢ ciency point of view. In either case, it is ambiguous whether or
not there is underinvestment.
26
Let us now analyze the same problem when we use the R solution to
predict payo¤s in period 2. In that case, player Ss payo¤ is
Unes =
8<:
x
2 ; if y  x2
x  y; if x  y  x2
0; if x < y
Thus, its expected payo¤ in period 1 is given by
EUnes = H
x
2
 x
2
+
h
H (x) H
x
2
i
x 
Z x
x
2
ydH (y) :
Note that under non-exclusivity investment incentives are ine¢ ciently low.
The question is whether or not exclusivity may help reducing the underin-
vestment problem.
Under exclusivity, if y  x then players B and S split their surplus, x,
without any interference from E: Hence, U es =
x
2 . If y  x then player x
arrives at the grand coalition securing x2 : But now, the added value of the
grand coalition is y   x: As a result, player Ss payo¤ is U es = x6 + y3 . Thus,
its expected payo¤ in period 1 is given by
EU es = H (x)
x
2
+ [1 H (x)] x
6
+
1
3
Z 1
x
ydH (x) :
Therefore, the di¤erence EU es  EUnes is not independent of x:
 
h
H (x) H
x
2
i x
2
+
1
3
Z 1
x
ydH (x) +
Z x
x
2
ydH (y) :
Exclusivity undermines player Ss ability to capture the return on his invest-
ment e¤orts if x2  y  x, but in contrast it enhances his ability whenever
y > x: Therefore, if investment costs are su¢ ciently low, then H(x) is close
to 1 and exclusivity actually hurts investment incentives. In this case, the
paradoxical result obtained by SeW is exacerbated. However, if investment
costs are su¢ ciently high, then H(x) will be close to 0, and exclusivity
improves investment incentives. In other words, under the R solution ex-
clusivity helps protecting relation-specic investment only when the sellers
competitive position is su¢ ciently weak. Exclusivity is useful only when
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there is a lot to protect. Finally, the rst order conditions for maximization
of ss prots under exclusivity coincide under the Shapley value and the
R solution, (10). Thus, if investment costs are su¢ ciently high (x low) ;
then the level of investment under exclusivity will be ine¢ ciently high.
Conclusion 5 Under the R solution an exclusivity contract may increase
or decrease Ss incentives to invest. If investment costs are su¢ ciently high
then an exclusivity contract reduces the underinvestment problem. If costs
are even higher then exclusivity may overprotect his relation-specic invest-
ment, in the sense that the investment level may be ine¢ ciently high.
4.3 Stipulated damages and entry barriers (Spier and Whin-
ston, 1995)
Spier and Whinston (1995), SpW, study how contracts between a buyer and
an incumbent seller may prevent entry by an alternative seller. The type
of contracts they consider have more structure than in those considered by
SeW. In particular, they specify a price, p; and the level of damages, b,
that B has to pay S in case she breaches the contract (and purchases from
E). In fact, it can be shown that, for all renegotiation concepts considered
below, it is optimal to stipulate an arbitrarily large b (which is equivalent to
an exclusive contract), since it can always be renegotiated down whenever
a trade between B and E is e¢ cient.5 Thus, players S and B can always
guarantee for themselves p  (1  x) and 1  p, respectively.
SpW, assumes that the entrant has a rst-mover advantage, while the
incumbent and the buyer engage in bilateral bargaining. At the beginning
of period 2 the entrant makes an irreversible price o¤er, pe, and next players
B and S equally split any surplus exceeding their disagreement point.
5 In order to prove that the optimal contract includes an arbitrarily high level of dam-
ages, we need to consider the performance of contracts with relatively low values of b:
In this case, the R solution to simultaneous, bilateral negotiations includes a positive
probability to ine¢ cient trades (Region 3 in Section 2).
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The entrants optimal strategy is to set pe = 1   x whenever he is the
most e¢ cient supplier (y  x). On the contrary, if the incumbent seller is
more e¢ cient (y < x) then any price above his own cost, pe  1   y, will
be unable to attract the buyer. Thus, if y < x then S and B have nothing
to renegotiate, since the sum of their threat points is equal to the value of
their trade. Moreover, nothing can be gained by letting B purchase from
E at a price pe  1   y > 1   x: Thus, the payo¤ of players S and B are
given respectively by Us = p   (1  x), Ub = 1   p. On the other hand, if
y  x then the coalition between B and S is indi¤erent between trading
at the preestablished price p and letting B purchase from E at the price
pe = 1   x: Player S will agree to implement the second option only if the
renegotiated level of damages, b0, satisfy b0  p   (1  x). Similarly, player
B will agree if and only if 1  (1  x)  b0  1  p: These two conditions can
only hold if b0 = p+ x  1: Hence, Us = p  (1  x) and Ub = 1  p:
Summarizing, in the case where the entrant enjoys a rst-mover advan-
tage then player Ss expected utility in period 1 is
EUs = x+ p  1:
Also note that Bs expected utility does not depend on x: Therefore, the
level of investment chosen by S is also the level which the coalition fB;Sg
nds optimal. In particular, player S chooses ex, which is given by
1 = 	0 (ex) :
Clearly, ex > x:
Conclusion 6 If the entrant enjoys a rst-mover advantage and buyer and
seller engage in bilateral renegotiation, then the optimal contract generates
overinvestment, which in this context implies that investment is an e¤ective
entry barrier, since it reduces the frequency of transactions realized by the
entrant below the e¢ cient level.
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Let us now analyze the same problem using the R solution to predict
payo¤s in period 2. (In this particular example, the predictions of the Shap-
ley value coincide with those of the R solution, conditional on the optimal
contract.)
If y < x then the value of all coalitions are the following:
V = x;
vBS = x; vE = 0;
vBE = 1  p; vS = p  (1  x);
vSE = p  (1  x) ; vB = 1  p:
Note that in this case none of the three two-player coalitions provide any
positive net value, i.e., for all i; j = B;S;E, vij = vi + vj . Moreover, the
grand coalition provides no additional value: V = vBS : Therefore, the nal
payo¤s coincide with vi, for i = B;S;E. In particular, Us = x+p 1, which
is identical to the result obtained in SpW.
If y  x then the value of all coalitions are the following:6
V = y;
vBS = x; vE = 0;
vBE = 1  p; vS = p  (1  x);
vSE = p  (1  y) ; vB = 1  p:
In this case, there is only one coalition that provides a positive net value,
vSE > vS + vE : Thus,
Ts =
x+ y
2
  (1  p) ;
Tb = 1  p;
6The way we have written vSE presumes that player S can deliver the good to B (and
fullll his contractual obligations), which is actually produced by E. If such a transaction
were not feasible, and hence vSE = vB = 0, the qualitative results would not change.
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Te =
y   x
2
:
Since these three fall-back options add up to y, then the nal payo¤s coincide
with these values. Therefore, player Ss expected utility is
EUs = H (x)x+ [1 H (x)] x
2
+
1
2
Z 1
x
ydH (y)  (1  p) :
Thus, player S chooses x = bx, x < bx < ex: In this case the application of
the R solution does not change the qualitative results of the original paper,
although it does moderate the strength of their results.
Conclusion 7 Under the R solution there is also overinvestment, but the
size of the ine¢ ciency is lower than in the case of an entrant with a rst-
mover advantage.
4.4 Discussion
In this section we have applied the R solution to various existing economic
models. In the original papers, authors use either ad hoc restrictions on the
structure of the renegotiation game and/or the Shapley value. The variety
of approaches reects the lack of consensus on how to approach these three-
player bargaining games. In particular, some authors reveal their preference
to make special assumptions about the structure of the game rather than
use a general solution concept like the Shapley value.
In the discussion of these examples, we have shown that some important
qualitative results are not robust to changes in the solution concept. There-
fore, the modeling choices over the renegotiation game are, in fact, crucial.
Papers like HM and SeW contained surprising results that tended to con-
tradict to some extent the received wisdom. If we apply the R solution
to these models it turns out that important qualitative results become am-
biguous. In other words, these models seem to be able to accommodate
the traditional intuitions as well as the counterintuitive results they empha-
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sized. For instance, under the R solution, if the incumbent sellers compet-
itive position with respect to potential entrants is relatively weak, then an
exclusivity contract will help protecting their relation-specic investments,
as it had been frequently argued in the past. However, if the incumbents
competitive position is relatively strong, then an exclusivity contract may
actually reduce the sensitivity of the incumbents payo¤ to their investment
and hence exacerbate the underinvestment problem, as suggested by SeW.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
First we propose an  R two-player solution for the game (N; v) for  small
enough. This will show existence. To save in notation, ,we will dispose of
the () index of the solution.
1) If v13 < 12v12 (so that v12  v13 + v23 is also satised), consider
u121 = u
12
1 =
1
2v12, and u
ij
i = 0 for all i; j 6= 1; 2. Also, let p12 = 1    and
any p13, p23 so that p13 + p23 = . For this to be a solution, we need ti33 = 0
for i = 1; 2. Also, in this case
ti3i =
(1  )12v12
1  pi3 ;
and also t121 = t
12
2 = 0. Note that t
i3
i  (1   )12v12 > (1   )vi3 since
1
2v12 > vi3. Thus, for  small enough t
i3
i > vi3. Thus all condititons are
satied and therefore this is an  R two-player solution exists for the game
(N; v).
2) If v13 = 12v12 > v23, consider u
12
1 = u
12
1 =
1
2v12 (= v13), and u
23
2 =
u233 = 0. Also, let p12 = 1    and p13 = 0, p23 = . Then t121 = 0. Also,
t232 =
(1 ) 1
2
v12
(1 ) =
1
2v12 > v23. Therefore, u
23
2 = 0 and consequently t
12
2 = 0.
Thus this is indeed the solution if complete it with t131 = (1 )12v12, t131 = 0,
u131 = (1  2)v13 and u133 = 2 .
3) If v13 = v23 = 12v12, consider u
12
1 = u
12
2 =
1
2v12 (= vi3, i = 1; 2),
p12 = 1    and p13 = p23 = 2 . Then t131 = t232 =
(1 ) 1
2
v12
(1  
2
) < vi3, i = 1; 2.
Also, consider u133 = u
23
3 = A > 0. Thus, t
i3
3 , i = 1; 2, will have to satisfy:
ti33 =

2A
1  2
; and
A =
1
2
 
vi3  
(1  )12v12
1  2
+

2A
1  2
!
;
and solving for A taking into account that 12v12 = vi3, we obtain
A =
vi3
4  3 :
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Note that for  small ti33 + t
i3
i vi3, i = 1; 2. Also, note that given these values
for U i3i , we have t
12
1 = t
12
2 =

2
(vi3 A)
 =
(v12 2A)
4 , so that t
12
1 + t
12
2 < v12.
Thus, u121 = u
12
2 =
1
2v12 satises the denition.
4) If v12  v13 + v23 but v13 > 12v12, then consider u121 = u131 = u1, to be
obtained later, with 0 < u1 < v13, and u232 = u
23
3 = 0. Note that this implies
that u122 = v12   u1 > u232 and u133 = v13   u1 > u233 , which implies that
p23  . Let p23 = . Then p12 = 1    p13. Finally, u232 = u233 = 0 implies
that t122 = t
13
3 = 0, and we can then check that t
12
2 + t
12
2 < v12, whereas
t131 + t
13
3 =
p12u
12
2
1   +
p13u
13
3
1  
= (v12   u1)  p13(v12   v13)
1   :
We will propose u1 su¢ ciently close to v13 so that t131 + t
13
3  v13. In that
case, the denition of solution in u121 and u
13
1 gives us the following two
equations
u1 =
1
2
(v13 +
(1    p13)u1
1  p13 ) =
1
2
(v12 +
p13u1
1  p13 ):
This is a system with two unknowns. Note that if we have a (valid) solution
to this system, then as  approaches 0 the rst equation approaches u1 =
1
2(v13+u1) whose only solution is v13 = u1. (For positive , indeed u1 < v13.)
Thus, for  small enough, t131 + t
13
3 < v12 u1 = v12  2v13+ v13+(v13 u1)
and the right hand side converges to v12   2v13 + v13 < v13. Also, solving
for u1, we can write the system as
v13

2  p13
p13 + 

= 2  p13 + 
p13
:
This is a quadratic equation in p13 with only a positive root that converges to
0 as  converges to zero. Thus, the proposed solution satises the conditions
for  small enough. And for  small, p12 is close to 1.
5) If v12 < v13 + v23, then propose u
ij
i = u
ik
i = ui > 0, for all i; j; k =
1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k; i 6= k. Then the denition of uiji requires that ui+uj = vij
for all ij. This is a system of three linear (independent) equations with
solution ui =
vij+vik vjk
2 . Also, t
ij
i =
pikUi
1 pij . Finally, p is the solution to
u1 =
1
2
(v12 +
p13U1
p13 + p23
  p23U2
p13 + p23
)
u2 =
1
2
(v23 +
p12U2
p13 + p12
  p13U3
p13 + p12
)
u3 =
1
2
(v13 +
p12U1
p23 + p12
  p23U3
p23 + p12
):
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(Note that if these ui + uj = vij and ui = 12(v12+ t
ij
i   tijj ) implies that
uj =
1
2(v12+ t
ij
j   tiji )). Taking into account ui + uj = vij , these equations
can be written as
 p13u2 + p23u1 = 0
 p12u3 + p13u2 = 0
 p12u3 + p23u1 = 0:
Note that the third equation is simply the sum of the previous two. That
is, there are only two linearly independent equations. Thus, two of these
equations plus p13 + p23 + p23 = 1 form a linear system with a unique
solution. The solution is a probability distribution, since all three variables
take positive values. Indeed, the rst two equations cn be written as p13u1 =
p23
u2
and p12u2 =
p13
u3
, so that all solution vectors to these two equations have
either all positive components or all negative. And no solution with all
negative components satises the equation p13+p23+p23 = 1. Finally, note
that tijj + t
ij
i =
pjkuj
pjk+pik
  pikuipjk+pik , so that since both uj ; ui < vij , indeed t
ij
j +
tiji < vij .
Next, we can simply check that if we select the    R SSBN that we
have just characterized, then the lim!0 fU(); t(); p()g is as stated in the
proposition. Thus, we only need showing that there is no other triple fu; t; pg
that is the limit of a sequence of    R SSBN as  approaches 0. We do so
by contradiction.
a) If v13  12v12 (so that v12  v13 + v23 is also satised), consider a
limit where u121 ,u
12
1 6= 12v12. Note that this implies that either u12i > u12j for
some i = 1; 2, i 6= j, or u121 = u122 = 0. In the latter case, this means that
for  small t121 + t
12
2 > v12. But for any , t
12
1  v13 and t122  v23. Thus,
since v12  v13 + v23 we obtain a contradiction. Now, if u12i > u12j for some
i = 1; 2, i 6= j, then the limit p12 < 1. Indeed, for the limit u12i > 12v12
we need to have in the limit t12i > 0. Thus, u
i3
i > 0 for  small, which is a
contradiction if p12 is close to 1, since
ti3i =
p12
1  pi3u
12
i >
p12
1  pi3
1
2
v12;
and the right hand side is larger than vi3  12v12 if p12 is close enough to 1.
Thus we can only have the limit u121 6= u122 if for  small pi3 is larger than
 for i = 1 or 2. This in turn means that for  small (and then in the limit
as  ! 0), ui3i  u12i and ui33  uj33 for some i = 1 or 2 and j 6= i. Assume
i = 1. That means that in the limit u121  u131  v13  12v12. Thus, w can
only hve that u122 >
1
2v12. Again, that means that t
12
2 =
p23u232
1 p12 does not
approach zero as the  approaches 0. Therefore, again p23 >  for  small,
which implies that u232  u122 for  small, and this is a contradiction, since
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in the limit u122 > v23. We can use exactly the same argument to exclude
the alternative case, where i = 2. Thus, we conclude that in this region the
limit of any sequence of    R SSBN when  ! 0 satises u121 = u121 = 12 .
It follows that p12 = 1. Indeed, if p13 > 0 in the limit, then for  small
u131  u121 = v13. This is only possible if t131 = p121 p13u121 = v13, which
requires p12 = 1   p13 since u121 = v13. Thus, this requires that p23 = 0.
In this case, t122 = 0, whereas t
12
1 =
p13
1 p12u
13
1 = v13, and then u
12
1 > u
12
2 ,
which contradicts u121 = u
12
2 . The same argument shows that p23 > 0 is a
contradiction.
b) If v12  v13+v23 but v13 > 12v12 and v13 < v12, as in the previous case,
u121 = u
12
2 = 0 implies that for  small t
12
1 + t
12
2 > v12. But for any , t
12
1  v13
and t122  v23. Thus, again, since v12  v13 + v23 we obtain a contradiction.
We can also reject the possibility that both p13 > 0 and p23 > 0. Indeed, that
would imply that for  small u131  u121 and u232  u122 whereas u131  v13
and u232  v23, so that this would imply u121 + u122 = v12  v13 + v23.
This is only possible if for  small v12 = v13 + v23, u131 = u
12
1 = v13, and
u232 = u
12
2 = v23, so that u
13
3 = u
23
3 = 0. But then for i = 1; 2 we would
have t13i =
p12
1 pi3 vi3 < vi3, which contradicts u
i3
3 = 0. Thus, we have that
pi3 = 0 for i = 1 or 2. Assume now that p13 = 0 but p23 > 0 in the
limit. Thus, t121 =
p13
p13+p23
u131 ! 0, and t122 = p23p13+p23u232 
p23
p13+p23
u122 for
 small, where this last inequality follows from the fact that for  small
p23 > . Thus, from the denition of u
ij
i , we have that for  small u
12
2 =
1
2
 
v12 + t
12
2   t121
  12 v12 + p23p13+p23u122   t121  ! 12  v12 + u122 . Thus, in
the limit u122 = v12 > v23, and this contradicts that u
23
2  u122 . The same
argument precludes that p13 > 0 and p23 = 0 in the limit unless v12 = v13.
Thus, in the limit when v13 < v12 we must have p12 = 1. Also, this
implies that in the limit t232 = u
12
2 and t
13
1 = u
12
1 , whereas t
13
3 = t
23
3 = 0. If
v12 > v13+v23, and since t232 + t
13
1 = v12, we must have that for  small either
t131 + t
13
3 > v13 or t
23
2 + t
23
3 > v23, or both, and therefore either u
13
1 = 0 or
u232 = 0 or both. In latter case we have that for  > 0 the only solution would
be u122 = u
12
1 =
1
2v12 < v13 which is a contradiction with t
13
1 + t
13
3 > v13.
Also, if for  small u131 = 0 and u
23
2 > 0 then u
12
1  12v12 < v13, which
again contradicts t131 + t
13
3 > v13. Thus, we only have to consider the case
that for  small u131 > 0 and u
23
2 = 0 so that t
12
2 = 0. Note that u
12
1  u131
since p12 >  for  small. Also, if u121 > u
13
1 in the limit, then for  small
t131 =
p12
p12+p23
u121 > u
13
1 , which could only happen if u
13
1 = 0, which would be
a contradiction. Thus, we have that for  small u121 = u
13
1 . This is exactly
the case we have considered in 4) above, so that the result will be exactly
the one obtained there.
c) Consider the case v12 = v13 and then v12 = v13 + v23 with v23 = 0,
and show that we can only have u121 = u
13
1 = v12, and therefore u
ij
i = 0 for
i 6= 1, j 6= i. Note that for any , u23i = 0 and so t1ii = 0 for i = 2; 3. This
guarantees that t1i1 + t
1i
i  v1i for i = 2; 3. Now, assume that in the limit
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v12 > u
12
1 ; u
13
1 . This means that u
12
2 ; u
13
3 > 0. Then for  small, p23  .
Assume moreover that in the limit u121 > u
13
1 . Then also for  small p13  .
In this case 1     p12  1   2. Thus t131 = p121 p13u121  1 21 u121 and
t121 =
p13
1 p12u
13
1 < u
13
1 . Thus, for  small we get a contradiction: t
13
1 > t
12
1 ,
which implies that u131  u121 in the limit. We get the same contradiction if
we assume that u121 < u
13
1 . Now, assume that in the limit u
12
1 = u
13
1 = u1.
Given  we must have
u121 =
1
2
(v12 +
p13
p13 + p23
u131 )
u131 =
1
2
(v12 +
p12
p12 + p23
u121 ):
Since u121 converges to the same value as u
13
1 then for
p13
p13+p23
and p12p12+p23
converge to the same value which has to be 1, since p23 converges to 0. Then
we conclude that u1 = v12.
d) Assume v12 < v13+ v23. We will show that in the limit we must have
uiji = u
ik
i for all i; j; k = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k, i 6= k.
d.1) First, assume that in the limit u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 > u
23
2 . Then for 
small we must have p13; p23  . Also, since u121 > 0 and u122 > 0, we must
have that for  small t121 + t
12
2  v12 and so u121 + u122 = v12. This will also
happen in the limit. Then, in the limit either u121 < v13 or u
12
2 < v23 since
v12 < v13 + v23. If u121 < v13 then
t131 + t
13
3 =
p12u
12
1
1  p13 +
p23u
23
3
1  p13 < u
12
1 + v23:
The right hand side converges to u121 < v13. That is, for  small t
13
1 + t
13
3 <
v13. Thus, for  small
u131 =
1
2
 
v13 + t
13
1   t133
  1
2

v13 + (1  2)u121  

1  v23

:
The right hand side is larger than u121 for  small enough, again since u
12
1 <
v13. This contradicts that u121 > u
13
1 . Note that we have not used the fact
that v13  v23. Thus, the same argument shows a contradiction if instead
of u121 < v13 we had assumed that u
12
2 < v23. In fact, we have not used the
fact that v12 > v13; v23 but only the fact that v12 < v13 + v23. Since this
still happens when we make a permutation of the subindeces, we have shown
that we cannot have as a limit uiji > u
ij
i and u
ij
j > u
jk
j for any i; j; k = 1; 2; 3,
i 6= j 6= k, i 6= k.
d.2) Second, assume that in the limit u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 < u
23
2 . According
to the denition, this requires that for  small p13  , and p12  . Thus,
p23  1   2. Also, t122 = p23u
23
2
1 p12 which converges to u
23
2 and t
12
1 =
p13u131
1 p12
which converges to 0. Thus, t121 + t
12
2 converges to U
23
2 . Therefore, for 
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small either t121 + t
12
2 > v12 (and then U
12
1 = 0), which would lead to a
contradiction with u121 > u
13
1 , or u
12
2  t122 , which contradicts u122 < u232
since t122 converges to u
23
2 . Again, note that we have not used the fact that
v12 > v13; v23, and therefore we have just shown that we cannot have as a
limit uiji > u
ij
i and u
ij
j < u
jk
j for any i; j; k = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k, i 6= k.
d.3) Third, assume that in the limit u121 > u
13
1 and u
12
2 = u
23
2 . Note that
we have already proved that it would be impossible to have also u133 > u
23
3 .
Thus we only need to consider u133 < u
23
3 and u
13
3 = u
23
3 . Thus, assume
further that u133 < u
23
3 . Then p13  . Also, assume that in the limit p12 = 0.
In this case an argument similar to the one in d2) nds a contradiction:
t122 =
p23u232
1 p12 which converges to u
23
2 and t
12
1 =
p13u131
1 p12 which converges to 0.
Thus, t121 + t
12
2 converges to u
23
2 . Therefore, for  small either t
12
1 + t
12
2 > v12,
which would lead to a contradiction with u121 > u
13
1 , or u
12
2  t122 . Since t122
converges to u232 , and in the limit u
12
2 = u
23
2 = u2, then we conclude that in
the limit u122 = t
12
2 , which means that also in the limit u
12
1 = t
12
1 = 0, and
this contradicts u121 > u
13
1 . Thus, if u
12
1 > u
13
1 , u
12
2 = u
23
2 and u
13
3 < u
23
3 , then
p12 > 0 in the limit. Exactly the same argument, replacing 1; 2 for 2; 3 and
vice versa, shows that in the limit p23 > 0. Thus, assume that u121 > u
13
1 ,
u122 = u
23
2 , u
13
3 < u
23
3 , p12; p23 > 0, and p13 = 0 in the limit. Then, since
u121 > 0 and u
23
3 > 0 , for  small we have t
12
2 =
p23u232
1 p12 which converges to
u232 = u
12
2 . Also, t
23
2 =
p12U122
1 p13 which converges to u
12
2 = u
23
2 . This implies
that t122 +t
12
1 converges to v12, and since t
12
1 converges to 0, u
12
2 must converge
to v12. Likewise, U232 must converge to v23. Thus, u
12
1 and u
23
3 converge to
0 and this again contradicts that in the limit u121 > u
13
1 and u
23
3 > u
13
3 .
Therefore this case is not possible and the other case left to consider is
u121 > u
13
1 , u
12
2 = u
23
2 = u2, u
13
3 = u
23
3 = u3, and p13   for  small. Note
that u121 >, and then for  small, ad then in the limit, we must have that
u121 + u2 = v12. Now, for u
12
1 = v12 in the limit, it would be required that
for  small t121 is su¢ ciently close to v12. But t
12
1 =
p13u131
1 p12 <
p13u121
1 p12  v12.
The di¤erence u121   u131 in the limit gurantees that this cannot innitely
approach v12. Thus, we conclude that u2 > 0, and therefore u2 + u3 = v23.
Therefore, for  small
u3 =
1
2
 
v23 + t
23
3   t232

=
1
2

v23 +
p13
p13 + p12
u3   p12
p13 + p12
(v23   u3)

;
and solving for u3 we obtain u3 =
p13
p13+p12
v23. If p12 > 0 in the limit,
this implies that in the limit u3 = v23 which implies that u2 = 0. We
have already seen that this leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be
the case that p12 = p13 = 0 and p23 = 1 in the limit. Then in the limit
t121 = t
13
1 = 0, and t
12
2 = u2 > 0. This can only happen if for  small u2 is
su¢ ciently close to v12, so that in the limit u2 = v12 and therefore u121 = 0,
which is a contradiction. Once again, we have not used the relative ranking
of vij in this discussion, therefore this shows that we cannot have a limit
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with uiji > u
ik
i and u
ij
i = u
jk
j .
d.4) Thus, the only possibility left is that in equilibrium we have u121 =
u131 = u1, u
12
2 = u
23
2 = u2, and u
13
3 = u
23
3 = u3. Note that this implies
that tiji  ui, for all i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. Then not all these values ui can
be zero. Also, if two of the values were 0, say u1 = 0, u2 = 0, then for 
small t121 + t
12
2 < v12, which is a contradiction. Finally, if one of the values
were 0, say u1 = 0, but the rest are positive, that gurantees that for  small
tiji + t
ij
j  vij for all i; j = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j. Therefore, u2 = v12 and u3 = v13.
But this is impossible, since v12 + v13 > v23. The last inequality still holds
if we reorder the subindexes, and therefore this shows that ui > 0 for all
i = 1; 2; 3. This is what we have considered in 5) above. We have seen
there that this uniquely denes values ui, and then also p and t are uniquely
dened. This concludes the proof.
6.2 SpW: Optimal contract includes arbitrary large b
We compute the Ss and Es payo¤s for a given contract, (p; b), with p  1,
a given value of x and a realized value of y, assuming that payo¤s in period
2 are determined by the R solution. First, we obtain the game (N; v), as
follows: V = 1   min f1  x; 1  yg = max fx; yg; vB = 1   p, vE = 0,
vSE = p min f1  x; 1  yg = p+max fx; yg  1.For the rest of the values,
we have to distinguish between two cases: if b > p+ y  1, then vBE = 1  p
and vS = p+ x  1; if b  p+ y   1, then vBE = y   b and vS = b. Indeed,
in the rst case the pair BE would nd it in their interest to buy from
S, whereas in the second case they will prefer to trade themselves and pay
the clause b. Given these values, we can compute ij , i; j = B;S;E, to
determine the region in which we are, and also who is player 1; 2; and 3, in
our convention:
(i) If b > p + y   1, then BS = BE = 0, and SE = max fy   x; 0g.
Thus, we are in Region 1 of Section 2. (In this case, Region 1 and 2 coincide.)
(ii) If b  p + y   1, BS = p + x   1   b, BE = p + x   1   b, and
SE = p+max fx; yg   1  b. Thus, we are in Region 3 of Section 2.
In all cases, we can assign the index 1 to player S, the index 2 to player
E, and the index 3 to player B.
Applying to these particular games the formulas provided in Table 1, we
obtain that, in (i)
US = p+
x
2
  1 + max
nx
2
;
y
2
o
;
UE = max

0;
y   x
2

:
Also, in (ii)
US =
x+ 2max fx  y; 0g+ 2b+ p  1
3
;
UE =
y   b+ p  1
3
:
39
We can now compute the expected payo¤s for players S and E, for a
given value of x. If b < p, these payo¤s are
S(x) =
Z x
0
(p+ x  1) dH(y) +Z 1+b p
x

p+
x+ y
2
  1

dH(y) +
Z 1
1+b p
x+ 2b+ p  1
3
dH(y);
E(x) =
Z 1+b p
x
y   x
2
dH(y) +
Z 1
1+b p

y   b+ 2x  p+ 1
3

dH(y);
if x  1 + b  p, and
S(x) =
Z 1+b p
0
(p+ x  1) dH(y) +Z x
1+b p

x+
2b  2y + p  1
3

dH(y) +
Z 1
x
x+ 2b+ p  1
3
dH(y);
E(x) =
Z x
1+b p
y   b+ p  1
3
dH(y) +
Z 1
x

y   b+ 2x  p+ 1
3

dH(y);
if x > 1 + b  p. On the other hand, if b  p, these payo¤s are
S(x) =
Z x
0
(p+ x  1) dH(y) +
Z 1
x

p+
x+ y
2
  1

dH(y);
E(x) =
Z 1
x
y   x
2
dH(y):
First, note that, for any x, E(x) is lowest when b  p. Indeed, y x2 >
y   b+2x p+13 when y > x; 1 + b  p. That is, for every value of x the share
of surplus that E appropriates is lowest if b is large enough. Even more, for
given x, the sum of expected payo¤s for E and B, that is E [V ]  E(x) are
(weakly) increasing in b, since V = max fx; yg is independent of b for given
x, and E(x) is (weakly) decreasing in b. On the other hand, the incentives
of S to invest, 0S(x), are largest when b  p. Indeed, in this case
0S(x) =
1 +H(x)
2
;
whereas if b < p, then
0S(x) =
2 + 3H(x) + max fH(x);H(1 + b  p)g
2
:
Lastly, the payo¤s of B are (weakly) increasing in x. Indeed, if b < p, then
B(x) =
Z 1+b p
0
(1  p) dH(y)+
Z 1
1+b p

2 (1  p)
3
+
min fx; yg   b
3

dH(y);
40
and if b  p, these payo¤s are
B(x) =
Z 1
0
(1  p) dH(y):
Thus, the incentives of S to invest are (weakly) too low from the point of
view of the pair SB, are highest when b  p, and, keeping x constant, the
b that maximizes the joint payo¤s of S and B is also any b  p. All this is
independent of the value of p:Thus, we conclude that the optimal contract
should include b  p.j
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